Charlie on the Griddle
         August 2, 2010
         Now on the Congressional  griddle for widespread ethical and possibly criminal misdeeds, Harlem  Congressman Charles Rangel has been a controversial figure in his dealings with  the NYPD for four decades. 
         On April 14, 1972, as a new  Congressman, Rangel was involved up in one of the police department’s most  appalling incidents — its release of a dozen suspects after police  officer Philip Cardillo was fatally shot inside a Harlem mosque.
         Fearing a riot outside  the West 116th Street Mosque Number 7, police allowed the suspects to  go free without first identifying them, relying on alleged promises by Rangel  and Minister Louis Farrakhan that the men would later surrender to the police. 
         The suspects never showed  up, and no one was convicted in Cardillo’s death. 
         Eight years later in 1980, a Manhattan  grand jury under District Attorney Robert Morgenthau determined that police  brass had caved in to political pressures, dooming any chance of justice from  the start. 
         The police investigation had been  “curtailed in deference to fears of civil unrest in the black community,” the  grand jury report read. “The long-term interests of justice in apprehending  criminals were overridden by the short-term concern of preventing civil  disorder.” 
         According to the  department’s top secret report, prepared a year after the shooting under James  Hannon, the Chief of Operations, then the department’s highest ranking  uniformed officer, Rangel was one of three prominent black officials who  appeared at the mosque as the riot raged outside.
         The report, which the department kept  secret for the next 11 years, said that the other two black officials, Farrakhan  and the Deputy Commissioner for Community Relations Benjamin Ward, “took the  position that the street would return to normal if the police were removed from  the area, including the mosque.” 
         Chief of Detectives Al Seedman then made  what Hannon’s report described as “the reluctant decision” to move the  investigation to the 24th precinct “on the promise of Mosque officials  to produce the detainees thereat.” 
         “Seedman,” the report stated, “continued  his investigation in the Mosque but after about 15 minutes either Rangel or  Farrakhan approached him and told him that they had better get out of the  Mosque or there would be trouble; that they could not control the crowd  outside. Seedman now felt that with the reduced uniform presence protecting the  scene outside, he was in an untenable position.” 
         According to the report, Seedman said  that the decision to transfer the investigation to the 24th precinct  was his. He explained that “no police officers at the scene could identify any  person … as being involved in the incident.” 
         Seedman added that either Farrakhan or  Rangel had promised he would produce the suspects at the 24th  precinct. 
         None showed up. 
         In 1983 after Ward was named as the  city’s first black police commissioner, Newsday asked Rangel whether he had  promised to produce the suspects released from the mosque, as Seedman had  claimed. 
         Rangel denied making such a promise. 
         “I couldn’t promise anyone to the  precinct,” he said. “For me to negotiate over a bunch of hoodlums with an  officer I didn’t know is ... ridiculous.”
         Retired police captain  Edward Mamet, who has been on something of a crusade to vindicate Seedman, has offered  another explanation. He says that, after Ward was named police commissioner,  “Seedman gave me his notes, from memory, regarding what he had told the grand  jury.”