The NYPD’s Divisive Intelligence Division
September 28, 2009
No one in New York City, and arguably in the nation, has done more to combat terrorism than Ray Kelly.
Since returning as New York City Police Commissioner four months after the 9/11 attacks, he has made fighting terrorism his mission, creating a Counter-Terrorism Division, revamping the department’s Intelligence Division, and marching the department past its traditional boundaries, both physical and legal.
He has stationed detectives overseas in terrorism hotspots. He has also publicized the importance of the “homegrown” threat.
No question, he has made New York City safer. President Obama expressed his “appreciation and admiration” for Kelly’s anti-terrorism efforts following the arrests of three Afghan-born terrorism-related suspects.
Yet despite these accomplishments and successes, elements of Kelly’s personality sometimes hamper his fight against terrorism.
Like most top law enforcements officials, he has an outsized ego and sense of his importance. He is as controlling as former mayor Rudy Giuliani, who dismissed him as commissioner in 1994 and whom Kelly increasingly resembles.
He also remains bitter and unforgiving towards those he feels have slighted or wronged him. His bitterness runs so deep that he sometimes seems to shape policies — even measures against terrorism — through his prism of resentments.
This is perhaps most apparent in his dealings with the FBI, which, he and others feel, failed to protect New York City from the terrorists’ attacks on 9/11.
As Kelly put it shortly after returning as police commissioner: “We have to protect ourselves.”
Until the FBI took the unprecedented step of bringing Joe Demarest out of retirement last year to head its New York office because he gets along with Kelly, the commissioner had gone out of his way to publicly criticize and ridicule the Bureau.
Take the anonymous quote that appeared in the New York Post in 2003 that the FBI “couldn’t pick out a Yemeni from a Palestinian.” FBI officials believed the quote came from Kelly.
To set the department on its own course, Kelly hired a former top CIA operative, David Cohen, to head the NYPD’s Intelligence Division.
While detectives in the Counter-Terrorism Bureau work alongside FBI agents through the Joint [FBI-NYPD] Terrorism Task Force, the Intelligence Division operates independently of the Bureau.
It has conducted out of state investigations — where the NYPD has no legal authority — without informing either local authorities or the FBI.
It has refused, despite two court decisions, to turn over documents related to its spying on political groups before the 2004 Republican National convention.
With Mayor Michael Bloomberg distancing himself from department matters, Kelly and Cohen have run the Intelligence Division with no civilian oversight and with no accountability to the public.
A former top department official recently described Intel, as it is referred to inside the department, as “a mini-CIA” within a municipal agency, without the safeguards to ensure that it does not break the law.
Despite Obama’s recent praise for the NYPD in its anti-terrorism fight, it became apparent last week that something had gone awry inside the Intelligence Division.
Under the guise of protecting the city, Intel appeared to have disrupted an FBI investigation into perhaps the most serious terrorism threat to New York City since 9/11.
Apparently without informing the Bureau, which had been tracking terrorism suspect Najibullah Zazi since he returned from an al Qaeda training camp in Pakistan a year ago, Intel detectives showed his photo to one of their informants, a Queens imam, Ahmad Wais Afzali.
The imam then tipped off Zazi, who cut short his trip to New York and flew home to Colorado the next day, short-circuiting the FBI’s investigation.
The Bureau was forced to prematurely arrest him, his father and Afzali, before learning the full extent of the plot.
A second former top NYPD official said that the question is not whether the NYPD made a mistake in judgment by showing Zazi’s photo to Afzali but whether the Intelligence Division acted on its own in contacting its informant, a decision that defied protocol and common sense.
Some officials question whether the Intelligence Division’s real reason in going to Afzali was not merely to obtain information but to outplay the Bureau, as it did after the 2004 Madrid train bombings when Intel detectives, on Cohen’s orders, rushed to interview Spanish authorities before the FBI did.