More Kelly Versus Mukasey
January 12, 2009
Let’s add another dimension to the extraordinary exchange of letters between NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly and the United States Attorney General Michael Mukasey over the NYPD’s domestic surveillance of terrorism suspects.
This added perspective comes care of the New York Civil Liberties Union, which cites recent history to raise concerns that the NYPD may be illegally spying on citizens.
Last fall, Kelly accused senior Justice Department officials of denying his requests for wiretap warrants from the special Foreign Surveillance Court to monitor terrorism suspects.
Mukasey wrote back that Kelly’s views were “contrary to the law.”
Writing in the New York Law Journal last month, the New York Civil Liberties Union Associate Director Chris Dunn provided some context for their disagreement.
Police surveillance of domestic political activity became controversial in the late 1960s and early 70s, Dunn writes, with the emergence of such radical and violent groups as the Weathermen and Black Panthers.
In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that, despite national-security concerns, the government must obtain a judicial warrant before conducting electronic surveillance of American citizens.
Six years later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorized certain domestic surveillance beyond traditional investigations into suspected crimes. FISA authorized the government to spy on American citizens, even though, Dunn writes, “probable cause does not exist to believe they are involved in criminal activity.”
To conduct this surveillance, the government had to obtain authorization from the special, FISA-created “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court”(FISC). All applications from local law enforcement agencies like the NYPD were routed through the FBI and the Justice Department and needed the approval of the Attorney General.
It was this arrangement — under which the Justice Department and the FBI control NYPD authorization for FISA surveillance — that led to the recent Kelly- Mukasey exchange.
The NYPD had been caught in its own surveillance scandal in the late 1960s involving its unlawful treatment of political activists, Dunn writes. Some undercovers who had infiltrated political groups encouraged them to commit unlawful acts. The result was a consent decree known as the Handschu agreement, which restricted the NYPD’s political surveillance.
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Kelly sought to eliminate the Handschu restrictions. In February, 2003, federal judge Charles Haight granted the NYPD virtually unlimited surveillance powers.
That spring, following two anti-Iraq war demonstrations, it surfaced that the department’s revamped Intelligence Division under Deputy Commissioner David Cohen, a former high-ranking CIA official, had questioned arrested demonstrators in jail about their political affiliations, entering that information into a database. Haight then rescinded many of the Handschu modifications he had ordered.
Then, in the summer of 2003, the Intelligence Division launched a nationwide surveillance operation of groups planning to protest at the 2004 Republican National Convention at Madison Square Garden. That operation did not surface until 2007 when the city, defending itself against law suits, disclosed it intended to rely on intelligence information to justify the NYPD’s harsh treatment of convention protestors. The NYPD, writes Dunn, “has vigorously resist[ed] orders that it produce undercover reports produced during the operation.